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Quayside: Seed Readiness.

A fictional marina software company preparing a $2.5M seed round. The names and figures are invented; the depth and approach reflect the review you’ll receive.

Quayside

Confidential

Quayside: Seed Readiness

What an investor will find, and what to fix before they do

Prepared by Blood & Treasure for the Quayside founders

September 24, 2026

Bloodandtreasure.com
Quayside

Note on scope

You asked whether the deck is ready for a $2.5M seed round. This report answers that, and tests the analysis you sent rather than repeating it.

You sent the seed deck (22 slides), a market sizing workbook and a short note: you plan to open conversations with eight funds in November and want to know what will stop them. We read every page, checked the claims that matter against public sources and looked for competitors the deck does not mention.

One pattern sits under almost every finding, so it is worth saying up front: the deck pitches a marketplace, and the evidence describes a well-liked booking tool. A booking tool is a fundable business. A marketplace story told on booking-tool evidence is what makes an investor stop trusting the rest of the deck.

Items marked [OPEN] are questions only you can answer. Each one changes a recommendation. Treat this draft as directionally right and precisely wrong until they close.

Quayside

1. The Answer, In One Page

Not yet: reconcile the numbers, correct the market story and resolve the cap table before you pitch.

The product is real, marinas like it and net revenue retention is strong. None of that is the problem. The problem is that a careful investor will find four things in the first hour of diligence, and each one makes the next one look worse.

  1. 1.The customer count does not reconcile. Slide 9 says 41 marinas are live. Slide 14's MRR at your own average price implies 30 paying.
  2. 2.The market size is the marinas' revenue, not yours. $4.1B is berth fees. Your reachable software spend is closer to $15M a year.
  3. 3."No direct competitors" is not true. Two funded booking platforms already sell to the same harbormasters in the UK and the Netherlands.
  4. 4.The marketplace is 6% of bookings. The rest come through each marina's own website widget, which is SaaS revenue, valued as SaaS.

Re-cut the story as the booking and payments layer for independent marinas, with the consumer app as upside rather than the thesis. That version survives diligence. The current version invites a valuation you cannot defend.

Quayside

2. Where the Deck Won't Hold Up

Four slides make claims the rest of the deck contradicts, and an investor will find each one before the first meeting ends.

SlideClaimWhat diligence findsReplace with
941 marinas live30 paying at the stated priceSeparate paying, piloting and signed; verify status
6$4.1B marketBerth fees, not software spendBottom-up: 1,900 marinas × $7.7k
11No direct competitorsTwo funded platforms in UK and NLA real competition grid
15Marketplace flywheel6% of bookings via the appWidget-led SaaS, app as option

The competitor slide is the one to fix first. A missing competitor is the fastest way to lose an investor's trust, because it suggests either you do not know the market or you hoped they would not check. Both platforms have raised in the last eighteen months and both list UK marinas as customers on their own websites.

Sources: Competitor websites and published funding announcements; UK and Dutch marina association member counts.

Quayside

3. The Business Underneath

The business is healthier than the deck makes it look, once it is described as what it is.

Strip out the marketplace framing and the numbers are good for this stage: 118% net revenue retention, zero logo churn in twelve months and a sales cycle that has fallen from eleven weeks to five. That is the story to lead with.

  • Model: subscription plus a payments margin. The margin is where the upside is, and it depends on becoming a payments platform (see Slow Steps First).
  • Market: about 1,900 independent marinas across your two countries. At your realized price that is a $15M a year opportunity before expansion, enough for a seed round, not enough for the valuation implied on slide 20.
  • Team: strong on product and sales. No one has run payments or compliance, and the plan now depends on both.

OPENIs the 6% app share rising month on month? If it has doubled since spring, the marketplace story has evidence behind it and should stay, with the chart.

Quayside

4. Slow Steps First

Three things take months whatever you spend, so they start this week, before the round.

StepWhy it is slowTypical timeStart by
Payments platform approvalProvider underwriting plus checks on each marina3 to 5 monthsNow
Cap table clean-up2023 convertible note is missing from the cap table4 to 8 weeksBefore first meeting
Dutch entity and VATNeeded to contract Dutch marinas directly6 to 10 weeksOctober

The payments approval matters most. Every month it slips is a month the payments margin in your model does not exist, and an investor will discount the forecast accordingly. Starting it now also gives you a better answer to the question you will be asked in every meeting: what is the money for?

Quayside

5. Primary Deal-Breakers

Two issues would end a process on their own; the rest only slow it down.

  • Deal-breaker: the unreconciled customer count. Investors forgive small numbers. They do not forgive numbers that change between slides.
  • Deal-breaker: the missing convertible note. A cap table that is wrong in a data room stops legal diligence until it is fixed, and makes the investor wonder what else is wrong.
  • Slows it down: market sizing, competitor slide, marketplace framing. Each is fixable in a week of work.
Quayside

6. Next 30 Days

Do these in order; the first three are cheap and remove most of the risk.

  1. 1.Reconcile slide 9 and slide 14 and show paying, piloting and signed separately.
  2. 2.Put the 2023 note on the cap table and have counsel confirm the conversion terms.
  3. 3.Rebuild the competitor slide with the two platforms on it and the honest reason marinas pick you.
  4. 4.Apply for payments platform approval and add the timeline to the use-of-funds slide.
  5. 5.Replace the $4.1B slide with the bottom-up number and the expansion path beyond it.
  6. 6.Re-run the deck with us before the first fund meeting in November.
Quayside

Annex: What Would Change This Report

Three facts we could not check would each move a recommendation.

  • If the 11 non-paying marinas have signed contracts with billing dates, the traction gap is timing and slide 9 needs a footnote, not a rewrite.
  • If app bookings are growing faster than widget bookings, keep the marketplace story and prove it with the trend.
  • If the convertible note has already converted, the cap table issue is paperwork, not a deal-breaker.
Quayside

Closing

Pitch the business you have; it is a good one.

Everything in this report is the same recommendation at different levels of detail: describe Quayside as the booking and payments layer for independent marinas, make every number agree with every other number, and start the slow steps before you need them. That gives investors a clearer basis to assess the business in November.

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